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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                     
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 This case presents a substantive due process challenge 
to several provisions of a New Jersey licensing statute 
regulating the practice of midwifery.  The plaintiffs/appellants 
are several aspiring midwives, a midwife not presently licensed 
by the State of New Jersey, and several couples who wish to 
employ a midwife to assist with the birth of their next child. We 
hold that the New Jersey statute passes constitutional muster. 
  
I. 
 A person is "regarded as practicing midwifery" under 
New Jersey's statute if he or she "attends a woman in childbirth 
as a midwife, or advertises as such."0  N.J. Stat. Ann.  
                                                           
0
  The definition section of the statute stipulates that it does 
not apply to "gratuitous service in case of emergency" or to "the 
service of any legally qualified physician or surgeon." 
§ 45:10-1.  Persons wishing to practice midwifery in New Jersey 
first must obtain a midwifery license from the state board of 
medical examiners.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 45:10-2.  Candidates for a 
license must pass an examination designed "to test the scientific 
and practical fitness of candidates to practice midwifery," N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 45:10-5,0 and must complete an application 
                                                           
0
  Section 45:10-5 provides: 
 
The examination may be oral or written, or 
both, and shall be in the English language 
and shall be held on the following subjects: 
 
a.  Anatomy of the pelvis and female 
generative organs. 
 
b.  Physiology of menstruation. 
 
c.  Diagnosis and management of pregnancy. 
 
d.  Diagnosis of foetal presentation and 
position. 
 
e.  Mechanism and management of normal labor. 
 
f.  Management of the puerperium. 
 
g.  Injuries to the genital organs following 
labor. 
 
h.  Sepsis and antisepsis in relation to 
labor. 
 
i.  Special care of the bed and lying-room. 
 
j.  Hygiene of the mother and infant. 
 
k.  Asphyxiation, convulsions, malformation 
and infectious diseases of the newborn. 
 
l.  Cause and effects of ophthalmia 
neonatorum. 
 
m.  Abnormal condition requiring attendance 
of a physician. 
 
evidencing, inter alia, that they are of good moral character, 
and that they have "received a certificate or diploma from a 
legally incorporated school of midwifery, or maternity hospital, 
in good standing . . ., after at least eighteen hundred hours' 
instruction within a period of not less than nine months."  N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 45:10-3.0  Candidates also must get a physician 
registered in the State of New Jersey to indorse their 
application.  Id. 
 Appellant Alice Sammon, though not licensed in New 
Jersey, has a nursing degree from a certified nursing school and 
substantial apprenticeship training as a midwife.  She has 
assisted in several hundred births and is registered as a midwife 
with the North American Registry of Midwives.  Appellants Michael 
and Stefania Santomenna, Tracy Leal and Tom Quinn, and Tony and 
Vicki DiIoia (the "parents") are couples who plan to expand their 
families and desire to employ midwives to assist them with home 
births.  Appellants Vicki DiIoia, Leal, and Landi Simone (the 
"aspiring midwives") intend, if permitted, to pursue careers as 
midwives in New Jersey. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
The examination shall be sufficient to test 
the scientific and practical fitness of 
candidates to practice midwifery, and the 
board may require examination on other 
subjects relating to midwifery from time to 
time. 
 
0
  The statute provides that in lieu of such a diploma, the 
candidate may provide "a certificate or diploma from a foreign 
institution of midwifery of equal requirements as determined by 
the board, conferring the full right to practice midwifery in the 
country in which it was issued."  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 45:10-3. 
 Appellants filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 
the New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners and Governor Christine 
Todd Whitman, claiming that the licensing scheme violates their 
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.  They sought 
injunctive relief against enforcement of the statute.  The 
district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and 
appellants filed this timely appeal.   
 
II. 
A. 
 The district court ruled that the aspiring midwives 
lacked standing to challenge the New Jersey statutory scheme 
because they had "made only wholly conclusory allegations that 
they aspire to become midwives," and had not alleged that they 
had "approached physicians and been denied sponsorship, or 
attempted to enroll in any one of thirty out of state mid-wife 
schools, or applied for a license to be a midwife, or sought out 
a registered maternity hospital."  (Dist. Ct. Op. at 6.)   
 The Supreme Court has held that "when standing is 
challenged on the basis of the pleadings, [courts must] 'accept 
as true all material allegations of the complaint, and . . . 
construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.'" 
Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 7 (1988) (quoting Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)); see generally Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).  Accordingly, 
for purposes of deciding the issue of standing at this stage of 
the case, we must accept as true the aspiring midwives' claims 
(1) that they sincerely desire to become midwives, (2) that the 
1800 hours of study and the physician-indorsement requirements 
"inhibit" them from taking steps necessary to become midwives, 
and (3) that "but for" the New Jersey statutory scheme, they 
would be able to become midwives and practice their chosen 
profession. 
 To establish standing, the aspiring midwives must meet 
the following requirements: 
First, [they] must have suffered "an injury 
in fact" -- an invasion of a legally 
protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized, and (b) "actual or imminent, 
not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" 
 
Second, there must be a causal connection 
between the injury and the conduct complained 
of -- the injury has to be "fairly . . . 
trace[able] to the challenged action of the 
defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] 
the independent action of some third party 
not before the court." 
 
Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to 
merely "speculative," that the injury will be 
"redressed by a favorable decision." 
 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (citations omitted); see also Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction §2.3, at 51 (1989).   
 The second and third Lujan factors are clearly present 
here.  As noted, the aspiring midwives allege that but for the 
1800-hour study and the physician-indorsement requirements, they 
would become licensed midwives.  Thus, the alleged injury -- not 
being able to practice their chosen profession -- is both fairly 
traceable to New Jersey's statutory scheme and likely to be 
redressed by a favorable decision ruling that scheme 
unconstitutional.   
 The allegations also suffice to establish an "injury in 
fact."  First, the aspiring midwives' assertion of a right to 
practice their chosen profession is a legally cognizable one. See 
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 n.23 (1976). Second, 
their injuries are "concrete and particularized" because the 
statutory requirements, by making it more difficult for the 
aspiring midwives to practice their chosen profession, affect 
each aspiring midwife in a "personal and individual way."  Lujan, 
504 U.S. at 560 n.1.  Finally, the injuries are "actual or 
imminent" and not "conjectural" or "hypothetical" because the 
aspiring midwives allege present sincere desires to work as 
midwives and claim that the New Jersey statutory scheme has 
deterred them from taking any steps towards reaching their goals. 
 That the aspiring midwives may not presently have the 
training necessary to work as midwives does not defeat their 
standing to challenge the New Jersey scheme.  We recognize that 
the existence of factual contingencies which stand between a 
litigant and her goal may at times defeat her standing to 
challenge a particular statutory barrier to reaching that same 
goal.  See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 127-28 (1973) 
("married couple" plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge 
Texas' abortion statute because the married woman was not 
pregnant and her "alleged injury" rested "on possible future 
contraceptive failure" that she intended to do her best to 
avoid); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502-08 (1975) 
(low-income plaintiffs had no standing to challenge a zoning 
ordinance because their ability to move into the zoned area 
"depended on the efforts and willingness of third parties to 
build low- and moderate-cost housing").  The aspiring midwives' 
claims are not based upon uncertain events, however.  While they 
do not presently have the training to function as midwives, the 
aspiring midwives allege both a present desire to become midwives 
and that the New Jersey statutory scheme -- including the 
training requirement -- is the only thing that prevents them from 
reaching that goal. 
 Nor is our analysis changed by the facts that the 
aspiring midwives have never applied for midwife licenses or 
asked physicians for indorsements.  We recognize that a 
litigant's failure to apply for a license may at times render her 
challenge to a licensing scheme unripe for judicial review.  See, 
e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources 
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 200-03 (1983).  In many 
cases, requiring litigants to actually apply for a license before 
challenging a licensing scheme "'prevent[s] courts, through 
avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves 
in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also 
. . . protect[s] the agencies from judicial interference until an 
administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt 
in a concrete way by the challenging parties.'"  Id. at 200 
(quoting Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967)). In 
the case at bar, however, there is no indication that the 
aspiring midwives possibly could obtain a license or a 
physician's indorsement without first going through the 1800 
hours of instruction.  Requiring these women to apply for a 
license or to approach physicians asking for indorsements before 
going through the required training -- as the district court 
appears to suggest -- accordingly would serve no purpose. 
Litigants are not required to make such futile gestures to 
establish ripeness.  Hailes v. United Air Lines, 464 F.2d 1006, 
1008 (5th Cir. 1972); Image Carrier Corp. v. Beame, 567 F.2d 
1197, 1201-02 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 979 (1979); 
see also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 
U.S. 324, 365 (1977) ("If an employer should announce his policy 
of discrimination by a sign reading 'Whites Only' on the hiring-
office door, his victims would not be limited to the few who 
ignored the sign and subjected themselves to personal rebuffs."); 
compare Newark Branch, NAACP v. Harrison, 907 F.2d 1408, 1415 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (plaintiff organization's members have no standing to 
challenge discriminatory employment practice because there was no 
indication that any of the members was deterred by the practice 
from applying for a job).0 
                                                           
0
  The defendants argue that Sammon's claim is barred by New 
Jersey's "entire controversy doctrine."  Because the district 
court concluded that the aspiring midwives had no standing, it 
was required to address that argument before reaching the merits 
of the plaintiffs' claim that New Jersey's licensing statute 
violates the substantive due process rights of those who wish to 
practice midwifery.  The district court concluded that Sammon's 
claim was barred under New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine 
because she had failed to attack the constitutionality of the 
statute in a previous prosecution for practicing midwifery in New 
Jersey without a license.  We do not reach this issue whether the 
complete controversy doctrine applies here because Sammon's 
complaint, even if consistent with the entire controversy 
doctrine, does not state a claim under which relief can be 
 B. 
 The parents also have standing to assert their claims. 
While none of the women are presently pregnant, they all have 
borne children in the past, intend to have additional children, 
and are determined to employ midwives to assist them with 
birthing those additional children at home.  In the past, the 
parents all either have travelled out of state to obtain the 
services of a midwife or have used the services of an unlicensed 
midwife. 
 In sum, we conclude that each of the plaintiffs has 
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the New Jersey 
statutory scheme regulating the practice of midwifery and that 
those claims are ripe for adjudication.  Accordingly, we proceed 
to the merits of the appellants' substantive due process 
challenge. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
granted and because the claim of the aspiring midwives would 
require us, in any event, to address the merits of Sammon's 
substantive due process claim. 
III. 
 The first step in any substantive due process case is 
to determine the standard of review.  "The choice of a standard 
of review . . . turns on whether a 'fundamental right' is 
implicated."  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 688 (3d 
Cir. 1991).  In order to determine what interests of the 
plaintiffs are at stake here and thus what the appropriate 
standard of review is, we must look solely to the allegations of 
the complaint and the provisions of the challenged statute.  
 Turning first to the statute, it is important to focus 
on what it does and does not do.  The statute regulates who may 
engage in practicing midwifery in New Jersey.  It does not 
prohibit midwifery.  Nor does it regulate where or in what manner 
birthing may take place.  It thus does not foreclose the parents 
from engaging the services of a midwife or from electing birth at 
home, natural child birth, or any particular procedure in the 
course of delivery.0 
 It is similarly important to focus on what the 
complaint does and does not allege.  The complaint alleges that 
the statute "unconstitutionally deprives plaintiff Sammon of her 
ability to earn a living at her chosen profession," and the 
aspiring midwives of "their ability to practice in their 
respective field of interest."  (App. at 25.)  With respect to 
                                                           
0
  The statute does require that midwives "secure the immediate 
services of a reputable registered physician whenever any 
abnormal signs or symptoms appear in either mother or infant." 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 45:10-8.  Plaintiffs do not challenge this 
portion of the statute.   
the parents, the complaint alleges that the statute "unduly 
restricts the right of the consumer plaintiffs to choose a 
birthing style and a qualified attendant of their choice."  (App. 
at 26.) 
 The complaint does not allege that there are no 
licensed midwives or a dearth of licensed midwives in New 
Jersey.0  It does allege that the statute makes it "practically 
impossible" for certain midwives -- "direct entry midwives" -- to 
be "licensed and make themselves accessible to consumers like" 
the parents.  (App. at 26 (emphasis supplied).)  While the 
complaint thus refers to "direct entry midwives" and to "direct 
entry midwifery," it gives limited content to these references. 
We are told only that direct entry midwives are "a class of 
providers historically and traditionally recognized in the State 
of New Jersey," (app. at 24-25), that "[d]irect entry midwifery 
has been primarily learned through apprenticeships served with 
practicing midwives, supplemented by relevant book study," (app. 
at 23-24), that it "is as safe, if not safer, than . . . births 
attended by physicians in hospitals," (app. at 18), and that it 
"is [not] identical in approach to the practice of a certified 
nurse midwife,"0 id. 
                                                           
0
  Plaintiffs' briefing acknowledges that there are certified 
nurse midwives licensed to practice midwifery in New Jersey. 
Certified nurse midwives are individuals who have satisfied the 
requirement for being a licensed nurse and have had further 
specialized training in an accredited program in midwifery. 
0
  See n.6, supra.  Plaintiffs' Reply Brief indicates that they 
will need discovery before they will be able to describe the 
difference in approach between the practice of midwifery by 
direct entry midwives and by certified nurse midwives. 
 Our independent research indicates that "direct entry 
midwifery" does not have a universally understood meaning.0 
Moreover, our research disclosed no source that used direct entry 
midwifery to describe a particular manner of practicing 
midwifery.  If plaintiffs' use of the phrase is intended to refer 
to a manner of practicing, however, New Jersey's statute does not 
foreclose anyone from obtaining a license to practice, or from 
practicing, direct entry midwifery so long as that individual 
meets the qualification specified in the statute.  
 Based upon the complaint and the statute, it is thus 
clear that the interests at stake here are the interest of Sammon 
and the aspiring midwives in practicing midwifery and the 
interest of the parents in selecting a midwife of their choice. 
These are not the kind of interests that have been found to be 
"fundamental" in the context of choosing the appropriate level of 
review for substantive due process purposes.  State restrictions 
on the right to practice a profession receive rational basis 
review rather than higher scrutiny.0  Williamson v. Lee Optical 
                                                           
0
  Direct entry is frequently used to describe a midwife who has 
received her training solely through an apprenticeship.  It is 
also used as a synonym for a "lay midwife," in the sense of a 
midwife who is not a licensed nurse or other health professional. 
Colorado, for example, licenses "direct-entry midwives."  It 
states that they are "also known as 'lay' midwives" and defines 
"direct-entry midwifery" as the "advising, attending, or 
assisting of a woman during pregnancy, labor and natural 
childbirth at home" in accordance with the licensing statute --
i.e., by persons who are authorized under the statute and who do 
not hold other professional licenses that authorize midwifery. 
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-37-101-102. 
 
0
  We thus reject the plaintiffs' contention that fundamental 
rights are at stake here and that the statute must, accordingly, 
of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Schware v. Board of Bar 
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).  Similarly, state 
restrictions on a patient's choice of particular health care 
providers are subjected only to rational basis review. 
Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975) (state may require that 
abortions be performed only by licensed physicians, even in the 
first trimester of pregnancy); Mitchell v. Clayton, 995 F.2d 772, 
774 (7th Cir. 1993) (state regulation of acupuncture evaluated 
under rational basis test); New York State Ophthalmological Soc'y 
v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (state regulation of 
ophthalmology not entitled to strict scrutiny review); Potts v. 
Illinois Dept. of Registration and Education, 538 N.E.2d 1140 
(Ill. 1989) (state regulation affecting the practice of 
naprapathy evaluated under rational basis standard); Leigh v. 
Board of Registration in Nursing, 506 N.E.2d 91 (Mass. 1987) 
(rejecting claim that regulation of midwifery should be reviewed 
under higher strict scrutiny standard); Bowland v. Municipal 
Court, 556 P.2d 1081 (Cal. 1976) (same).0   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
receive strict scrutiny.  Where strict scrutiny is required, the 
state must show that the statute serves a compelling state 
interest and that the state's objective could not be achieved by 
a measure less restrictive of the plaintiff's fundamental right. 
Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 268-69 (3d Cir. 1990).  Thus, 
if statutes licensing health care professionals were subject to 
this strict form of scrutiny, states would have to shoulder the 
burden of demonstrating that no less restrictive set of 
qualifications for a license could serve the state's interest in 
protecting the health of its citizens. 
0
  In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, state 
restrictions on a patient's choice of a particular treatment also 
have been found to warrant only rational basis review.  See, 
e.g., Carnohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(laetrile); Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455 (10th Cir.) 
 Where rational basis review is appropriate, a statute 
withstands a substantive due process challenge if the state 
identifies a legitimate state interest that the legislature 
rationally could conclude was served by the statute.  As we 
explained in Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981): 
The test for determining whether a law 
comports with substantive due process is 
whether the law is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest. "[T]he law need 
not be in every respect consistent with its 
aims to be constitutional.  It is enough that 
there is an evil at hand for correction, and 
that it might be thought that the particular 
legislative measure was a rational way to 
correct it." 
 
616 F.2d at 689 (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 
Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955)); see also Midnight Sessions, 
Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 682 (3d Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 984 (1992).  Determining whether a 
particular legislative scheme is rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental interest is a question of law.  Id.    
 We stress that a court engaging in rational basis 
review is not entitled to second guess the legislature on the 
factual assumptions or policy considerations underlying the 
statute.  If the legislature has assumed that people will react 
to the statute in a given way or that it will serve the desired 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(same), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 937 (1980); Mitchell v. Clayton, 
995 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1993) (acupuncture).  Because the 
challenged statute does not regulate the manner in which a mother 
gives birth, we have no occasion to determine the appropriate 
standard of review for a statute that regulates the manner of 
birthing. 
goal, the court is not authorized to determine whether people 
have reacted in the way predicted or whether the desired goal has 
been served.  The sole permitted inquiry is whether the 
legislature rationally might have believed the predicted reaction 
would occur or that the desired end would be served.  When 
legislation is being tested under rational basis review, "those 
challenging the legislative judgment must convince the court that 
the legislative facts on which the classification [of the 
statute] is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived as 
true by the governmental decisionmaker."  Vance v. Bradley, 440 
U.S. 93, 111 (1979); see also Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury 
Township, 808 F.2d 1023, 1034-35 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 482 
U.S. 906 (1987).  Thus, New Jersey's classification of what it 
takes to provide assurance of acceptable quality services from a 
midwife must be upheld unless they could not reasonably be 
conceived as serving that purpose.   
 
IV. 
 Appellees offer two state interests to justify the New 
Jersey regulatory scheme:  the interest in protecting the health 
and welfare of the mother and the interest in protecting the 
health and welfare of the child.  These are legitimate state 
interests.  See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973) 
(recognizing the state's interest in both the health of the 
mother and the viable fetus).     
 The regulatory scheme is also rationally related to 
these state interests.  Each of the complained of requirements --
(1) that applicants have at least 1800 hours of instruction, (2) 
that this instruction comes from a school of midwifery or a 
maternity hospital rather than an apprenticeship, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 45:10-3, and (3) that the application be indorsed by a 
registered physician, id. § 45:10-3 -- "might be thought" to 
further the state's interest in assuring that would-be midwives 
are qualified to perform their jobs.  Assuring that midwives are 
qualified, in turn, is rationally related to the state's valid 
interest in the health and safety of both mother and child.  See 
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889) (upholding doctors' 
licensing requirements because states have a legitimate interest 
in regulating the medical profession); Williamson v. Lee Optical 
of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (state may forbid 
opticians from fitting or duplicating lenses without a 
prescription from an ophthalmologist or optometrist). 
 The appellants maintain that the 1800 hours of 
instruction requirement is not "rationally-related" to New 
Jersey's legitimate goal of assuring that midwives are qualified 
to perform their jobs.  While we do not question plaintiffs' 
sincerity when they voice this opinion, it is sufficient to 
conclude that this is a matter about which reasonable minds can 
differ.  As the district court noted "1800 hours, or forty-five 
weeks of full time training, is not an irrational length of time, 
considering the serious nature of the work performed by 
midwives."  (Dist. Ct. Op. at 13.)  The mere fact that some 
students might perform as competent midwives without going 
through the full 1800 hours of training does not make the 
requirement "irrational."  The New Jersey legislature may well 
have decided that the 1800-hour training requirement will assure 
that midwives who go through 1800 hours' instruction are 
competent often enough to justify the burden to students who are 
competent at some point before 1800 hours of study.  We cannot 
say that the requirement is irrational given New Jersey's 
interests in both the technical competence of the entire 
population of midwives and the health of the entire population of 
midwife consumers.  While different training requirements might 
also further New Jersey's valid goals, "it is for the 
legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and 
disadvantages of the . . . requirement."  Williamson, 348 U.S. at 
487. 
 A similar analysis reveals the rationality of the other 
statutory requirements.  The requirement that would-be midwives 
receive their training through instruction at schools of 
midwifery or maternity hospitals rather than through the 
apprenticeship training also reflects a legislative judgment 
about which reasonable minds can differ.  We simply cannot say it 
is irrational to believe that midwives trained in schools of 
midwifery or at maternity hospitals on the whole are better able 
to protect the health of New Jersey mothers and children. 
 Plaintiffs profess concern about the physician 
indorsement requirement because it "imposes a significant barrier 
to entry upon persons seeking to practice midwifery."  This is 
true, they allege, "since direct entry midwives are broadly 
perceived . . . as potentially competing with obstetricians" and 
physicians have a conflict of interest when asked to vouch for 
the qualifications of an aspiring direct entry midwife.  (App. at 
24.)  While the complaint does not identify any otherwise 
qualified candidate who has allegedly asked and been refused 
indorsement, plaintiffs ask for the opportunity to prove that 
this "significant barrier" exists even where an applicant is 
otherwise qualified. 
 It is, of course, rational to believe that an 
obstetrician asked to indorse the qualifications of a midwife 
candidate will not be a wholly objective evaluator of a 
candidate's qualifications.  One can also make a substantial 
policy argument that the benefit to be derived from a physician 
indorsement requirement is outweighed by the burden it places on 
candidates.  It is not irrational, however, (1) to find value in 
soliciting the views of a medically trained individual who has 
had some personal contact with the candidate and has checked into 
his or her credentials, or (2) to conclude that there are 
sufficient members of the medical profession willing to perform 
this public service in good faith to make such a requirement 
workable.0 
 
V. 
 The root of this controversy is that plaintiffs believe 
apprenticeship training is as valuable as more formal training 
and that an examination could be devised that would assure 
adequate quality control.  They may be right.  However, the 
elected representatives of the people of New Jersey who voted for 
the statute took a contrary view.  While there are disputes of 
legislative fact involved in this disagreement, those disputes 
are not legally relevant under substantive due process 
jurisprudence. 
 The concern of the parents is that the statute makes it 
"practically impossible . . . to attain the substantial benefits 
-- in terms of access, cost and safety -- which can be made 
available through the use of direct entry midwives" and that as a 
result their "significant efforts" to identify direct entry 
midwives able and willing to assist them in home birthing in New 
Jersey have been unsuccessful.  As we have pointed out, however, 
the parents have no constitutional right to their choice of a 
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  The plaintiffs also claim that the midwife examination has not 
been given for many years.  They do not claim that anyone has 
asked and been denied the opportunity to sit for the examination, 
however. 
health care provider who does not meet quality control standards 
that a legislator might reasonably conceive to be desirable.0 
 
VI. 
 This controversy is one this court is not authorized to 
resolve and the plaintiffs must take their evidence and advocacy 
to the halls of the New Jersey's legislature.  The judgment of 
the district court will be affirmed.  
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  The complaint does not allege that the parents have made 
futile efforts to secure a licensed midwife to assist in home 
delivery.  Appellants' brief suggests, however, that at least 
some licensed midwives prefer not to assist in home deliveries. 
Assuming this to be true, it does not provide a basis for 
attacking a statute which not only does not prohibit home 
birthing but also reflects no preference for hospital deliveries. 
